eg Chinese Voices
No. 04 | 18.07.2021
How should platform enterprises be regulated? China contributes to global discussion with Alibaba antitrust case
Wu Zhenguo
Wu Zhenguo is the director-general of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR). He graduated from Shandong University with a Juris Doctor degree and has worked in both the Ministry of Textile Industry and the State Economic and Trade Commission.
In an interview with Antitrust Source, Wu Zhenguo reveals China’s antitrust achievements and challenges in great detail. As of April 16, 2021, according to Wu, the SAMR has concluded 1,580 merger cases and 299 monopoly cases since the SAMR was established in 2018, with fines and confiscations totaling US $3.15 billion, maintaining fair market competition and safeguarding people’s livelihoods and welfare. The rise of digital platforms has created new antitrust challenges around the world, and the SAMR has completed 13 cases related to the unlawful implementation of market concentration by platform companies like Alibaba and Tencent, marking China’s contribution to the wider global discussion about regulating the platform economy. In the context of the current geopolitical tensions between China and the US, Wu underscores that China has never and will never make antitrust enforcement a tool for geopolitics.
It’s time for Huawei to push back with China’s legal tools against foreign sanctions
Yang Jie
Yang Jie is a lawyer and senior partner at HuiYe Law Firm specializing in customs regulations and maritime law
On July 9, a Canadian judge forbade Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou from using documents provided by HSBC to her legal team as evidence in her extradition case. Still, Huawei has some legal tools at its disposal to protect itself against US sanctions, according to Yang Jie. Since the beginning of 2021, China has launched a series of laws in response to US sanctions against Chinese companies, such as China’s Blocking Statute(refers to 《阻断外国法律与措施不当域外适用办法》) and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (refers to 《中华人民共和国反外国制裁法》). Now, if the US were to ask HSBC for documents related to Huawei, per Article 5 of China’s Blocking Statute, Huawei could report this to the Chinese government; if it were affirmed that the US could be acting in violation of international law, the Chinese government could issue an injunction requiring HSBC to refuse to cooperate with the US Judiciary. Moreover, China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and Unreliable Entity List Provisions also enable Huawei to fight back at firms like HSBC for cutting off business dealings after Huawei was added to the US Entity List. Huawei could also use Article 2 of the Data Security Law to protect itself by preventing data from being transferred to the US.
China’s vision of multilateralism is a better alternative for the world
Wang Wen
Wang Wen is executive director of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China (RUC), vice president and professor of the Silk Road School of RUC, and a research fellow at the Financial Research Center of the Counselors’ Office of the State Council
The CPC and World Political Parties Summit held on July 6 was the largest, highest-level global political parties summit ever hosted by the CPC. Professor Wang Wen argues that the participation of leaders from over 160 countries, as well as international interest in the conference, discredits narratives peddled by Western media and politicians, such as “the world is against China” or “the international community hates China.” Unlike Western politicians, who evaluate other countries based on ideology or wealth, China makes international connections regardless of a country’s size or level of development. The CPC strives toward the true universal value of serving the people rather than serving the privileged few.
The “working group” model: The evolution of China’s approach to state governance
Academic Monthly
Inaugurated in 1957 and sponsored by the Shanghai Federation of Social Science Associations, Academic Monthly is a comprehensive journal focusing on theoretical research with significant academic influence. The author, Wang Hongming, is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the School of Political Science and Public Administration of China University of Political Science and Law.
The “working group” model, a key feature in the Chinese political system, played a significant role in China’s victory against the coronavirus in 2020. In this paper, Dr. Wang explores the origin, development, mechanisms, and practice of the “working group” model, a governance approach with Chinese characteristics. Mao Zedong’s Red Army “task force” was an early prototype for the “working group.” In the 1950s, “task forces” consisting of ex-military cadres led the land reform movement and organized the grassroots governing system. Since the reform era, “working groups” have been assigned from higher levels of government to lower-level departments to assure policy implementation, and they have become an important methodology of governance. For example, the CPC Central Committee dispatched “working groups” at various levels to mobilize members of the Party and society to help achieve the goal of eradicating extreme poverty.
Why was the Chinese Communist Party founded only in Shanghai? A peculiar explanation
Xiong Yuezhi
Xiong Yuezhi is a research professor at the Institute of History, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. His areas of interest include the history of modern China and Shanghai’s urban history.
A century ago, the first National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in Shanghai. In this article, Professor Xiong illustrates how Shanghai’s characteristics made it an ideal place for the birth of the Party. For example, similar to St. Petersburg, where the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917, Shanghai was China’s most open and populous city, with 2.45 million people in 1919. With its booming modern industries making up 51 percent of industrial output in the 1930s, Shanghai also had China’s largest working class. In addition, the colonially occupied “foreign concessions,” which were not subjected to Chinese governance, provided safe spaces for developing political activities. The second Party Congress, for instance, was held on the boundary between the French Concession and the Shanghai International Settlement, where oversight was weak. Moreover, the city’s safety and freedom during the war, as well as the development of transportation and postal services, made it possible for progressive intellectuals from all over China to gather in Shanghai to promote Marxism. Such intellectuals included Mao Zedong and Chen Duxiu, who went on to lay the foundations for the Communist Party

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